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PUNCTUATION OF STATUTES*
E. E. BROSSARD
P UNCTUATION of statutes is the subject of this report. Legis-
lative drafting involves that subject and justifies some re-
port thereon. No other report of the committee on legislative
drafting has touched that topic; and the chairman of the com-
mittee assumes full responsibility for this one. At every con-
ference considerable time is spent in discussing the punctua-
tion of proposed uniform acts. Hence some study of that topic
may be worth while.
"Punctuation is no part of the statute" said Justice Harlan
speaking for the court in Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co.,
"Punctuation marks are no part of an act" of congress said
Justice Sutherland speaking for the court in United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co. 2 "For the purpose of arriving
at the true meaning of a statute, courts read with such stops
as are manifestly required" said Chief Justice Fuller in United
States v. Lacher.- In Cushing v. Worrick the court said: "It
is unnecessary to resort to the draft of the bill a§ passed to be
engrossed, in order to explain the statute as actually en-
grossed; for the general rule is that punctuation is no part of
a statute."4 The law of England is the same as ours: "Punctua-
tion and brackets do not form parts of a statute, and if found
on the Parliament Roll, or a statute as printed by the King's
Printer, can only at the most be regarded as contemporanea
expositio." 5 The last quotation is the entire text on punctua-
tion in that monumental work of 31 volumes covering all the
laws of England. Said Lord Esher in Devonshire v. O'Connor:
"To my mind, however, it is perfectly clear that in an Act of
Parliament there are no such things as brackets any more
than there are such things as stops."
The pronouncements above quoted are definite and should'
*This is a copy of a report Imade to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws by the author as chairman of the Legislative Drafting
Committee. Mr. Brossard is the revisor of statutes of the state of Wisconsin.
"Punctuation of Statutes" has previously been printed in 24 ORE. L. REv. 157
(1945) and in 69 N.J.LJ., Nos. 9 and 10 (1946).
1105 U.S. 77 (1881).
2 287 U.S. 74, 82 (1931).
8 134 U.S. 624 (1890).
475 Mass. 382, 385 (1857).
5 27 EARL OF HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (1907-17).
c24 Q.B.D. 468, 478 (1890).
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be accepted as final. Texas hag clinched the point by enacting
a statute which declares that "in no case shall the punctuation
of a law control or affect the intention of the legislature in the
enactment thereof. '7 All states should enact a like statute.
Wisconsin has kindred provisions. Section 35.19, WISCONSIN
STATTES, provides that "subchapter, section, subsection and
paragraph titles, and history notes constitute.no part" of the.
law. That section should be amended by adding a provision
like that. of Texas upon. the subject of punctuation. The
alterhative is to adopt some text-book on the subject as the
official standard and decisive of all questions of punctuation.
Some states have resorted to that expedient for settling
disputed spellings and maybe capitalizing and compounding.
That no state has adopted that alternative as to punctuation
is a strong reason for suspecting that the idea is unsound.
Possibly this report should end here. The foregoing authori-
ties assert a sound and sufficient rule for the guidance of
courts in disposing of punctuation problems. Yet in spite of
what was said and often repeated by the Supreme Court of
the United States about punctuation of statutes the subject
will not down# Attorneys continue 'tdlwrangle and worry over
punctuation; and courts occasionally defend or fortify their
decisions with commas-absent or present or misplaced.
"There be men who can a hair divide 'twixt east and north-
east side."
Although punctuation is no part of a statute still punctua-
tion serves a very useful purpose; and no draftsman of
statutes can afford to disregard the subject. In fact he should
give very careful attention to the punctuation of his drafts.
PUNCTUATION DEFINED: "Punctuation in writing and print-
ing, a pointing off or separation of one part from another by
arbitrary marks; specifically, the division of a composition into
sentences and parts of sentences by the use of marks in-
dicating intended differences of effect by differences of form.
The points used for punctuation exclusively are the period or
full stop, the colon, the semicolon, and the comma. The inter-
rogation and exclamation point serve also for punctuation in
the place of one or another of these, while having a special
rhetorical effect of their own; and the dash is also used,
either alone or in conjunction with one of the preceding marks,
7 TEx. Ray. STAT. (1895) art. 3269; TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1914) art. 5503; Tax.
STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 11.
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in some cases where the sense or the nature of the pause
required can thereby be more clearly indicated. The modern
system of punctuation was gradually developed after the intro-
duction of printing, primarily through the efforts of Aldus
Manutius and his family. In ancient writing the words were
at first run together continuously; afterward they were sep-
arated by spaces, and sometimes by dots or other marks, which
were made to serve some of the purposes of modern punctu-
ation, and were retained in. early printing. Long after the
use of the present points became established, they were so
indiscriminately employed that, if closely followed, they are
often a hindrance rather than an aid in reading and under-
standing the text. There is still much uncertainty and arbi-
trariness in punctuation, but its chief office is now generally
understood to be that of facilitating a clear comprehension of
the sense. Close punctuation, characterized especially by the
use of many commas, was common in English in the 18th
century, and is the rule in present French usage; but open
punctuation, characterized by the avoidance of all pointing
not clearly required by the construction, now prevails in the
best English usage. In some cases, as in certain legal papers,
title-pages, etc., punctuation is wholly omitted. The principles
of punctuation are subtle, and an exact logical training is
requisite for the just application of them."8
"Punctuation. 1. The use of points or marks in written or
printed matter, for any of the following purposes: (1)
grammatical punctuation, to indicate a greater or less degree
of separation in the relations of the thought, as by division
into sentences, clauses, and phrases, to aid in the better com-
prehension of the meaning and grammatical relation of the
words; (2) rhetorical punctuation, to indicate some peculiarity
in the expression; (3) etymological punctuation, to indicate
something in regard to the formation, use, or omission of
words or parts of words; (4) punctuation for reference, to
refer thereader to some other place in the page or book .
Two styles of applying punctuation are now in use.
One is termed 'close,' the other 'open.' Close punctuation is
formal and constrained, and lacks the natural flow of words
which open p. produces. Close punctuation is to be found often
8 CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA.
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
in English books printed in the 18th and early in the 19th
century."'
The primary and legitimate function of punctuation is to
facilitate reading. The Style Manual of the United States
Government Printing Office says: "Punctuation is a device
to clarify the meaning of written or printed language ...
Well-planned word order requires a minimum of punctua-
tion. The trend toward less punctuation calls for skillful
phrasing to avoid ambiguity and insure exact interpretation."' 1)
No draftsman of statutes should rely upon commas to
convey his meaning. The language employed should carry the
sense. The meaning of a sentence should be the, same whether
the words are spoken or printed. A statute should mean the
same when it is read to the court as when it is read by the
court. And attorneys seldom pronounce the points when read-
ing to the court.
Punctuation is not a science. Writers on the subject call
punctuation an art, and those who teach the art disagree very
much among themselves as to the meaning of punctuation
marks within a sentence. There is not now and there never
has been a definite, authoritative standard for the internal
pointing of a sentence. The styles in punctuation-like those
in dress-change from time to time; but the constitutions and
statutes, adopted fifty or one hundred years ago mean the
same as when they were enacted. If punctuation is allowed to
control the meaning of a statute it become necessary to know
the rules of punctuation in use at the time the statute was
enacted. Even contemporaries disagree especially about the
use of the comma. One punctuator will insert a comma where
another would strike it out.
One work on punctuation says "It is evident, that, in many
cases, the use of the comma must depend on taste." A later
work commenting on the punctuation of that rule of punctua-
tion declares that each of the 3 commas used by the earlier
author was either erroneous or unnecessary. The use of the
comma depends largely on the "taste" of the punctuator! That
accords with Sam Weller's idea of spelling. In the celebrated
case of Bardell v. Pickwick" Justice Starleigh asked Mr.
Weller whether he spelled his name with a V or a W. The
9NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
30 STYLE MANUAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 101.
11 DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS
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witness replied: "That depends upon the taste and fancy of
the speller, my Lord."
"The principles of punctuation are subtle and an exact
logical training is requisite for a just application of them." '
The law has enough inherent subtlety of its own to warrant
the rejection of the subtle principles of punctuation when we
come to interpret statutes.
Some courts have said that when all else fails the court
will look to the punctuation of statutes to ascertain the legisla-
tive intent. Usually the decisions go no farther. The courts do
not tell us the meaning or significance of the marks. No
authority or standard is cited which will inform the reader
as to the language of punctuation. And the truth of the matter
is that punctuation like nature "speaks a various language."
Unless the weight or meaning of a punctuation mark is
definite and certain nothing is gained by relying thereon.
Distance is not determined by measurements made with a
stick of unknown and unascertainable length. The punctuation
of the opinions in decided cases furnishes good reason for
concluding that the standard generally used by judges is
their individual conception of proper pointing.
Long years ago Hill's PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC was used
in universities. The author was a Harvard professor of rhetoric
and oratory. His rules of punctuation are relegated to the
appendix. We learn from rule one that "judgment and taste
are . . . the guides to correct punctuation." Readers as well
as professsors possess varying "judgment and taste." Lord
Timothy Dexter must have thought of that when he produced
"A Pickle for the Wise One" for he threw in a can of assorted
commas and other marks to enable each customer to "season
according to taste." The opening paragraph of the introduc-
tion to Summey's MODERN PUNCTUATION reads: "A Harvard
professor of English, the author of a well known textbook on
English Composition, has said of punctuation, 'I have never
yet come across a book on the subject which did not leave me
more puzzled than it found me'." After he had encountered all
the books on that subject, "the last state of that man was
worse than the first." Reading the case law on that subject
may-affect a lawyer the same way.
The index of the University of Wisconsin Library lists the
following works on punctuation and only these:
12 CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA.
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PUNCTUATION by Horace Teall (1897).
MECHANICS OF WRITING by Edwin C. Woolley, (1909).
WHAT IS ENGLISH by C. H. Ward, (1917).
MODERN PUNCTUATION by Geo. Summey, Jr., (1919).
APPLIED BUSINESS ENGLISH by H. A. Hagar, (1924).
THE ART -OF WRITING AND SPEAKING THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE by Sherwin Cody, (1903).
BUTTERFIELD'S PUNCTUATION, (1858).
PUNCTUATION by Benj. Greenlief, (1835).
AN ESSAY ON PUNCTUATION by Joseph Robertson, (1785).
Professor Summey names 12 of the current works on
punctuation, none more than 20 years old except Wilson's
TREATISE ON ENGLISH PUNCTUATION which he characterizes
as "The great 19th century authority" and "The traditionally
standard textbook." Summey's list does not include a single
one of the books on the card index of the University Library.
The State Law Library lists nothing worth noticing. This
gives some hint as to the perplexity of a hunt for an authorita-
tive standard of the meaning or weight of punctuation points.
Some of the books lay down but few rules and others evolve
a multitude of rules of punctuation. Woolley's MECHANICS OF
WRITING gives 280 rules, classified as end punctuation, in-
terior punctuation and designated punctuation. For the use
of the comma he furnishes 199 rules. This is hair-splitting to
the nth degree. In his NEW HANDBOOK OF COMPOSITION he
reduces the comma rules to 10. And Mr. Teall, in his work,
has a single rule for use of the comma: "Insert a comma after
each slightest break of connection in the grammatical con-
struction of a clause or sentence, but not where the words are
closely connected in sense." Mr. Teall was the critical reader
for the STANDARD DICTIONARY. He tells us that "This rule is
very indefinite, as any sweeping rule must be." He also tells
of the feeling, almost of despair, arising from a search for a
reasonable and ccnsistent treatise on punctuation; and his
excuse for offering a new book on the subject is that a search
made by him "failed to disclose a work that is worthy of
unqualified recommendation." The excuse still holds good.
Nearly all of the discussions recorded in the law books
upon the subject of punctuation involve the internal point-
ing of a sentence and 90 per cent involve the comma. "The
questions in court relating to punctuation as affecting con-
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:struction have generally arisen on the presence, omission or
misplacing of commas."'"
Now if the points in a sentence are to decide its meaning
there must be a code or standard to determine the meaning of
the points in question. But there is no single standard. Double
or multiple standards fail to answer the need. The many codes
or systems of punctuation are not intended to serve that
purpose. The textbooks on punctuation are intended as guides
for composers and secretaries and compositors, for proof read-
ers and printers. And all of those codes have for their purpose
the making of printed matter easy to read. They proceed on
the theory that a sentence is correctly punctuated when the
marks enable-the reader to extract the contained idea with
the least mental exertion. The object sought to be obtained is
much like that of the teacher of penmanship. The meaning
of a sentence is the same whether it is scribbled or is written
Spencerian style. The difference between the two is a differ-
ence in the labor required to read them. None of the codes
of punctuation deals with putting meaning into the language
used. It is assumed that the words used carry the author's
meaning and that the reader can get along if all internal points
were omitted, but that his progress would be much retarded.
The punctuation aims at lifting the meaning of the words
into plain view so that the reader may catch the sense at
first glance and with the minimum of effort.
. Quoting again from the STYLE MANUAL of the United States
Printing Office: "The punctuation required even in well-
phrased text should aid clearness. If the use of a punctuation
mark is in doubt, the question to be asked is 'Why?' rather
than 'Why not?' If doubt persists, the mark should be omitted
to aid the smooth flow of words. Marks interrupt. They are
needed only to make the thought clearer or to facilitate oral
expression. Beyond that they are detrimental to speed, ease
and exactness of understanding. Rules for punctuation may
be arbitrary in origin and may be observed from habit or
inertia."14
Not one of these punctuation codes deals with the subject
from the standpoint of interpretation of statutes. That idea
is scarcely suggested. No jurist has ever published a system of
punctuation. Apparently each judge has his own notion of how
1a SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Lewis 1904)688.
11 STYLE MANUAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ]01.
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statutes and decisions should be punctuated. This is illustrated
by what the jurist said in a case which arose upon a Michigan
statute which provided that when the affidavit of a nonresi-
dent "is required, or may be received in judicial proceedings
in this state, to entitle the same to be read, it must be authen-
ticated" in a specified manner. It was contended that the
requirement of authentication applied only to affidavits
"received in judicial proceedings"; and did not apply to affi-
davits required elsewhere. The contention was rejected. The
court-said: "While punctuation is nQt of controlling import-
ance, yet if the statute was intended to be limited to judicial
proceedings it would have been more natural to omit the
comma after 'required.'" What did the justice mean by 'it
would have been more natural"? He may have meant that our
nature takes care of punctuation. There are other reported
cases indicating that judges rely upon feeling or some inner
prompting or natural bent or bias for disposing of questions
which turn upon the punctuation of statutes.
If the pointing of any passage which a judge is called on to
interpret harmonizes with his notions of proper punctuation
he holds the punctuation to be correct. Otherwise he condemns
it as erroneous and disregards it or proceeds to do his own
pointing. In short he refuses to have the meaning which the
language conveys to his mind changed or modified by points
which a bill-drafter or clerk or secretary or printer has in-
serted or omitted. The absence of a settled standard or rule
by which to determine the value or effect of the marks forces
the court to decide the contest in that way. It would be simpler
and better to make no pretense of depending upon punctuation
for ascertaining the legislative intent.
In- not one of the many cases examined does the court cite
a work on punctuation. Ask any judge or learned lawyer or
law librarian to name an authority which will help to resolve a
doubt which arises from the presence or absence of a comma
in a statute and he will answer that he knows of no such au-
thority or that he knows of no generally recognized authority.
Put that question to a supreme court reporter or to the style
critic or head proof reader in a large publishing house and
quite likely he will hand you a copy of DeVinne on CORRECT
COMPOSITION. Now if DeVinne lays down the rule for pointing
the statutes that fact should be known to those who interpret
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the statutes. But punctuators shall not tell the court what a
statute means. Even lawyers are denied that privilege.
It would be easy to demonstrate by the punctuation of the
opinions of supreme court justices that there is no generally
accepted system of punctuation. In the same way it can be
proved that there never was an authoritative standard. Con-
temporary justices do not punctuate alike. The little tempest
that has long raged among schoolmen over the second comma
in a triad appears in court opinions. These are examples:
Brandeis, J: "They refrained from violence, intimidation,
fraud end threats." -  Holmes, J: "The superintendent, or the
inmate, or his guardian, may appeal." The court "may affirm,
revise, or reverse the c.rder."10 One justice omitted the comma
at the conjunction. The other inserted a comma. "The sum
of such trifles is a trifle." In Crawford v. Burke the court
said: "In the enumeration of persons or things in acts of
Congrcss it has been the custom for many years to insert a
comma before the final 'and' or 'or' which precedes the last
thing enumerated, apparently for greater precision, but with-
out special significance. So little is punctuation a part of
statute3 that courts will read them with such stops as will give
effect to the whole."17
"The whole problem of punctuation resolves itself into
formulating a sinple body of rules for the use of the comma,"
says Logan, in his QUANTITATIVE PUNCTUATION. "The comma
is the least specialized of all points, therefore, the most
elusive. '"18
The interior marks of a sentence are usually inserted after
the sentence is completed; and the meaning of the sentence is
the guide to poirting it. Judge Caldwell says, "The words
control the punctuation marks, and not the punctuation marks
the words." When punctuation is contended for as fixing
the meaning of a statute the judge asks himself how he would
punctutfite the passage if he were its author. If he finds that
the punctuation tallies with his notions of what is "natural"
he holds that th-. punctuation is correct; otherwise he holds
that the punctuption is erroneous and proceeds to do his own
punctuating. This is but another way of saying that punctu-
15274 U.S. 59 (1927).
1274 U.S. 206 (1927).
17 195 U.S. 176, 192 (1904).
1 SUMMEY, MODERN PUNCTUATION 205.
19 Holmes v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 98 Fed. 240 (1899).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
ation is no part of a statute. The points help to unfold the
meaning; they do not originate or create the meaning. The
meaning is there independent of the points and ahead of them.
The punctuation aids in reading just as legibility of writing
helps; just as scope notes and black-faced titles to sections of
the statutes assist the reader. They create nothing, they de-
stroy nothing, they change nothing.
There are general rules of punctuation which all literate
persons are agreed upon. The marks to be used at the end of
a sentence (terminal points) are beyond dispute. The period
is not involved in this discussion, neither is the parenthesis.
Consider court opinions. It is an interesting fact that courts
say nothing of the punctuation of their decisions. Punctu-
ation marks should have the same significance in court opin-
ions as in statutes. Quite likely judges exercise a closer and
more complete control over the pointing of their opinions than
the legislature does over that of its enactments. If punctuation
carries any part of the meaning of a court opinion we should
expect that later opinions would sometimes explain the mean-
ing to be attached to commas found in earlier opinions. They
never do that. This also tends to show that contending about
commas in statutes is a modern pastime of no great import-
ance.
CONSTITUTIONS: We next consider punctuation of state
constitutions. Constitutions are prepared with great care by
learned lawyers. Meticulous attention 'is given to style and
grammar and punctuation. " You would expect that many
decisions applying constitutional provisions turned on punctu-
ation. Only 2 cases have been cited in the digests and textbooks
examined.
In Attorney General v. Blossom Justice Smith for the
court said that the motion before the court was "based exclu-
sively upon the third section of the 7th article of the Constitu-
tion of this state. ' '21 "It (section 3) is not altered in any re-
spect, from the article as reported by the Judiciary Com-
mittee, except as to a material punctuation. I will transcribe
it here, as it was reported by the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee of the convention. ' 122 A semi-colon had been sub-
stituted for a period. The court restored the period but made
no further allusion to the alteration.
20 Lavery, Punctuation in the Law, 9 A.B.A.J. 25e (1923).
2. 1 Wis. 317, 318, (1853).
• Id. at 323.
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The Arkansas Constitution provides that: "In all criminal
and penal cases, except those of treason and impeachment, the
governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations
of sentence and pardons after conviction; and to remit fines
and forfeitures -under such rules and regulations as shall be
prescribed by law." The court said: "The words 'in all penal
and criminal cases' and also the words 'after conviction'
qualify the2 bther part of the sentence, and confine the whole
powerof-the executive to such cases. The fact that a semicolon
follows the word 'conviction' instead of a comma, as in the
similar clause in the Constitution of 1836, can not be treated
as altering the mearing of the sentence." "Punctuation is
generally the least reliable guide' to the true meaning of a
sentence and should 1 e given a controlling effect only when
other tests fail.'"-2U
Legal textbooks on construction demonstrate that we are
considering a strictly modern subject. In 1857 Sedgwick pub-
lished his work on CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CON-
STITUT TONAL LAW. Punctuation is unmentioned. A second
edition of Sedgwick appeared in 1874. It contains a short note
which cites 3 cases on that subject. On the other hand Black
on INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (2nd ed. 1911) devotes 6 pages
to a discussion of the punctuation of statutes. This subject is
briefly treated and the decisions are cited under the title
Statutes in 59 C. J. Section 590.
Speaking of the 2 schools of punctuation (the open and the
close) Ward informs us that "very little is heard of those
terms nowadays, for they merely describe a revolution (begun
in the 60's and concluded in the 90's) against the copious Wil-
sonian commas. '' 4 Open punctuation is modern: close punctu-
ation is old style. Yet the some judges construe old statutes
and new ones and most likely they apply the same pointing
views to the one as to the other. Obviously that should not be if
punctuation is a key to the meaning. "The words of a statute
must be construed as they would have been the day after the
statute was passed, unless some subsequent statute has de-
clared that some other construction is to be adopted or has
altered the previous statute. ' '2 5
The decisions pay little attention to the fact that the printed
statute may differ in punctuation from the enrolled act, or
23 Hutton v. McCleskey, 132 Ark. 391, 394, 200 S.W. 1032, 1033 (1918).
24 WARD, WHAT IS ENGLISH 184.
25 Lord Esher in Share v. Wakefield, 22 Q.B.D. 242 (1888).
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to the fact that the bill as passed may differ from both. Ob-
viously, if the intent of the legislature is to be found in the
punctuation it must bc the punctuation of the bill as the legis-
lature passed it.26 The decisions apparently assume that the
punctuation found in the statute books is identical with the
punctuation of the printed bills on the desks of the members
of the legislature at the time those bills were passed. That is
a dangerous assumption because it is often at variance with
the facts. Probably in a majority of the cases where punctu-
ation was considered the provisions under construction were
read from compiled statutes where at times the original word-
ing was somewhat changed. Even in the printing of revised
acts where the words are identical with those of the enrolled
acts the punctuation may vary. A striking example of such
variation is found in the WISCONSIN STATUTES (1898).
The legislature authorized the revisers to publish those
statutes and said that "in performing the said work the
reviser, may correct punctuation." The legislature did not
refer to the pointing of the enrolled acts; and the revisers paid
little heed to that punctuation. They acted on the theory that
the puNctuation-at least the comma-was no part of the law.
That is evident from the liberty which the revisers took in
preparing the printer's copy for the STATUTES of 1898. Section
1689 i- given here w;th the punctuation found in the original
act:
"Section 1689. No person, company or corporation shall
( , ) directly or indirectly ( , ) take or receive in money, goods
(,) or things in action, or in any other way, any greater sum
(,) or any greater value (,) for the loan or forbearance
of money, goods (, ) or things in action (, ) than at the rate
of ten dollars upon one hundred dollars for one year; and in
the computation of interest upon any bond, note ( , ) or other
instrument or agreement (, ) interest shall not be com-
pounded, nor shall the interest thereon be construed to bear
interest ( , ) unless an agreement to that affect is clearly ex-
pressed in writing (,) and signed by the party to be charged
therewith." The 11 commas which are enclosed by curves were
struck out by the revisers under said authority to "correct
punctuation." In the STATUTES of 1898, this section has only
7 commas. They should have been reduced to 4. An examina-
26 McPhail v. Gerry, 55 Vt. 174 (1882); Taylor v. Caribou, 102 Me. 401, 405,
67 Atl. 2, 4 (1907).
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tion of many sections indicated that on the average 5 commas
per section were dropped from the former statutes by the
revisers in editing the WISCONSIN STATUTES of 1898. If this
rate holds good for the 7,000 sections it represents a saving
of 35,000 commas. Not an instance of an insertion of a comma
was found. There was no addition; it was all subtraction. The
revisers were Arthur L. Sanborn (a learned lawyer and long
time a United States district judge) and John R. Berryman
for many years librarian of the State Law Library. Judge
Sanborn did not misunderstand the authority given him by the
legislature. He knew that he had no power to change the law;
and it never entered his mind that changing the punctuation
by striking out thousands of commas might be changing the
meaning. The printed page bristling with points offended
his taste. He preferred the open punctuation. He substituted
the modern system (the newspaper and periodical code of
pointing) for the system which prevailed in 1878.
Sanborn & Berryman's idea of commas is in harmony with
that of Dean Henry Alford. He said: "The great enemies to
understanding anything printed in our language are the com-
mas. . . . I have some satisfaction in reflecting, that, in the
course of editing the Greek text of the New Testament, I
believe I have destroycd more than a thousand commas which
prevented the text being properly understood. '2 7 Dean Alford
insistel that the meaning controlled the punctuation. He did
not get the sense from the original punctuation but punctuated
from the sense.
A rather amusing example of this variation of punctuation
is afforded by a much cited but unimportant English case.
Barrow v. Wadkin.2r The statute in question was passed in
1773 and the action arose in 1857. The trial was before the
Master of the Rolls. He had the original roll and two editions
of the statute. The roll was not pointed. The points in the
prints were unlike. This was the question: Should the trouble-
some word be read "aliens," or "aliens' "-should the symbol
be a comma or should -t be an apostrophe? It looks like "much
ado about nothing." The Master ruled that common sense
and the text made for the possessive case. Really no rule of
punctuation was involved. A school child knows the sign of
possession. Punctuation experts could shed no light on the
27 A PLEA FOR THE QUEEN'S ENGLISH 98, 99.
28 24 Beavan's Reports 327, 330 (1857).
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problem. No one could know for sure what Parliament in-
tended. If the word "aliens" was in the possessive case the
meaning was different from what it would be if the word
were in the nominative or objective case. The Master sensed
the situation and suggested an appeal.
Let it be noted in this connection that publishers of our
general laws say nothing about punctuation. They do not tell
us who did the punctuating or where it came from. If you
doubt this statement look at your own statute books. The
rule is as here stated. There may be exceptions but none has
been noted.
Do most lawyers and judges know the details of legislative
procedure in other states? Do they know it in their own
state? Unless they are familiar with those details they do not
know who punctuated the statutes. Luce in his LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE tells us hcw that is done in Pennsylvania: "There
a bill is punctuated when introduced, but then for the use of
members is printed without any punctuation, and so it goes
through the Senate and House and is approved by the gover-
nor. In the laws as published aid as:placed in the hands of
the courts land the people, there is such punctuation as is in-
serted by the clerks in the office of the secretary: of the. Com-
monwealth but the courts pay it no attention."2 That is rather
surprising information to those who live outside of the Key-
stone state.
And how about the punctuation of the uniform acts? It is
not easy to ascertain who punctuated them. There is no orig-
inal roll, no master copy. The members of the conference are
not sure whose punctuation is found in the pamphlet copies
which carry the proposed uniform laws to the several states.
But passing that point it is safe to assert that the uniform
laws that are adopted are not identically punctuated in all
states. The bills for their enactment are prepared by experts
in many instances who have set notions about punctuating.
They do just as they see fit about the matter.
A word or two should be said about the punctuation of
municioal ordinances. In its broader sense a statute is "any
authoritatively declared rule, ordinance, decree or law. ' 30 The
system which applies to the punctuation of legislative enact-
ments applies to municipal ordinances, court rules of pro-
29 LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 560..
"0 NEW STANDARD DIcTIoNARY.
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cedure and administrative regulations; Who punctuated them
is past finding out and. seldom is any question raised about it.
WHO GOVERNS PUNCTUATION: Prof. Summey's survey
shows that present day authors and publishers use the comma
sparingly; that some leading dailies and magazines average
less than one comma per sentence. They have concluded that
their readers prefer few stops to many. Who makes the rules
for punctuating? "Publishers. It cannot be denied that in-
fluential printers are the real developers of punctuation. The
producers of books always have been * * *. Today the great-
est influence benind cur manuils is the judgment of a New
York printer, De Vinne. (De Vinne supervised the publishing
of the CENTURY DICTIONARY). * * * If you could know the
practice of twenty good houses in any matter, and should find
them all agreeing, you would feel assured that you knew the
best usage."',
But publishers do not enact our statutes; neither do they
interpret them. To permit their punctuation to control the
meaning of statutes is to substitute printers for legislatures
and courts.
De Vinne, "the gi'eatest influence behind our manuals,"
tells us that the treatises we had when he wrote gave but little
help to the compositor and that he wrote to help the compos-
itor; that different systems of pointing prevail in different
houses; that it is generally understood that punctuation is the
duty of the printer; that punctuation is not included in the
exact sciences; that the most useful rules are those that the
compositor makes for himself after a careful study of punctu-
ation in good editions of the writers; that the "comma is often
inserted where it muddles the sense" so that "the compositor
often has to read tho sentence twice or thrice before he can
discern its meaning;" that the compositor must study the
rules prevailing in the house in which he is employed; that
rules are of value but they can never take the place of an un-
derstanding of the subject matter; that the antiquated teach-
ing that the comma must be used to indicate pauses of the
voice is responsible for much of its misuse; and that "to
correct wrongly pointed copy the compositor should cogitate
and understand each sentence, and mentally determine the
points needed before he sets the first word."- 2^ De Vinne
' WARD, WHAT Is ENGLISH 145 (1917).
:;2 PRACTICE OF TYPOGRAPHY; CORRECT COMPOSITION 242-61.
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emphasizes his'point that rules can never take the place of an
understanding of the subject matter by a short sentence
punctuated 2 ways: "The prisoner said the witness was a
convicted thief. The prisoner, said the witness, was a con-
victed thief." Evidently De Vinne expected the compositor
would be guided by his "understanding of the subject matter"
in pointing the sentence. But a printer's understanding of the
subject matter cf a statute is not to be presumed superior to
the courts. No court, high or low, would tolerate such a pre-
sumption.
De Vinne's instructions are to printers. Printers are not
permitted to rewvrite their copy. They must take the compo-
sition as it is. They try to clarify by punctuating. On the
other hand the bounden duty of the draftsman of a statute
is to clarify by revision by rewriting until his composition
will stand up without the aid of punctuation props. The sen-
tence last quoted from De Vinne is really proof of how easy it
is to construct an ambiguous sentence. That sentence would
not depend on points if it were reconstructed thus: The
prisoner said that the witness was a convicted thief; or the
witness said that the prisoner was a convicted thief. Similar
examples of bad syntax have been used to prove that meaning
may hang-on a comma. Here is one: "Woman, without her,
man would be a savage." "Woman, without her man, would
be a _savage." Or take thii school boy riddle: "Would you
rather a lion eat you, or a tiger?" The comma is relied on to
keep the lion from eating the tiger. Those are a mere play
on words. Word juggling may be indulged for amusement;
but a statute is no place to "conjure with us in a double sense."
If the punctuation is important it is important to know who
does te punctuating. We have already seen what De Vinne
and other textbook authors say upon the subject generally.
The courts also have spoken on that point. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court said: "In giving construction to a statute, the
punctuation is entitled to small consideration, for that is more
likely to be the work of the engrossing clerk or the printer,
than of the legislature. '""
The Supreme Court of Maryland said: "With us the punctu-
ation is the work of the draftsman, the en ,rossers or the
printer."'  The Supreme Court of Louisihaa Paid: "It is but
Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428, 434 (1875).
.4 Manger v. Board of Examiners, 90 Md. 659, 669, 45 Atl. 891. 893 (1900).
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the work of a draftsman or amanuensis, engrosser, or often
of a printer."35 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said:
"Punctuation is generally the act of the clerk or printer.":;
"The presence or absence of a comma, according to the whim
of the printer or proofreader, is so nearly fortuitous that it
is a whoily unsafe aid to statutory interpretation. -7
Clerical and typographic errors must not be confused with
deliberate or intentional punctuation. A mechanical mistake
is one thing; a misapplication of rules is quite another matter.
U. S. r. Isham-- is frequently cited to show that the meaning
of a statute may be controlled by the punctuation. An act of
Congress required stamps upon commercial paper. The court
said: "There is probably an error in the punctuation of .the
statute in regard to the item which reads 'memorandum,
check, receipt, or other written or printed evidence of an
amount of money to be paid.' It should read 'memorandum-
check (with a hyphen between the words), receipt or other
written or printed evidence.'" That was simply a clerical or
typographical mistake. The art of punctuation was not in-
volved. In compounding words the hyphen is universally used
to join the words compounded. A clerk or stenographer evi-
dently thought the compound word was 2 words, and that
mistake let to separating the words by a comma. Everyone
knows that "memorandum-check" is not the same as "memor-
andum, check." And everyone knows that horse, colt are 2
animals and that mule-cow is only one. Mistakes of this char-
acter have no more to do with systems of punctuation than
the use of the wrong word has to do with rules of grammar.
Both reason and experience are against reliance upon
punctuation. The interior points of a sentence and their ab-
sence should not control the meaning or make it different
from what it would be if there were no such marks. We go
to the dictionaries for the meaning of words, be they spoken
or written. Where should a law student look for a standard
work on punctuation, if there is such a standard applicable to
the construction of statutes? In the law libraries. Well, there
is no work (standard or otherwise) on that subject in the
Wisconsin State Law Library. If there were agreement as to
the meaning or significance of a comma we might safely use
33 State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167 (1895).
:6 Ex parte Hunnicutt, 7 Okla. Cr. 213, 123 Pac. 179 (1912).
37 Erie R.R.Co. v. United States, 240 Fed. 28, 32 (1917).
::8 17 Wall. 496 (1873).
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it to help convey our ideas. In the absence of such common
understanding we are, if we rely on the presence or absence
of commas, in the predicament of Boy Scouts trying to wig-
wag without having a common system of signals.
Punctuating is interpreting. For he who points a statute
thereby puts his construction upon it. Now the interpretation
of statutes is the prerogative of the judicial branch of our gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court is the final word. Any other
theory throws our political structure out of plumb. Beyond
the word-definitions inserted in the statute, the legislature
does not control the meaning of the language which it employs.
The same holds true of punctuation. Paraphrasing the advice
Dick gave to Jack Cade at Blackheath: "The first thing we do
let's kill all the commas." 9
'9 Shakespeare, HENaY VI, Part 2, Act. 4.
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